Board configuration and IR adoption. Empirical evidence from European companies by Alfiero, Simona et al.
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
314 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 
VOLUME 15, ISSUE 1, FALL 2017, CONTINUED - 2 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANAGING CUSTOMER PROFITABILITY TO IMPROVE  
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN PSF 316 
 
Antonella Cugini, Silvia Pilonato 
 
TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM DIVERSITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE FASHION AND LUXURY INDUSTRY 325 
 
Domenico Rocco Cambrea, Giorgia Lussana, Fabio Quarato, Paola Varacca Capello  
 
EFFECT OF CASH FLOWS VOLATILITIES ON CURRENT INVESTMENTS 
IN COMPANIES LISTED ON THE TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE 341 
 
Hossein Rezaei Ranjabr 
 
BOARD STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION  
AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: ITALIAN EVIDENCE 347 
 
Vincenzo Scafarto, Federica Ricci, Gaetano Della Corte, Pasquale De Luca 
 
COMMITMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND  
UN INITIATIVES - RETURNS AND PERFORMANCE SHOWN 360 
 
Shirley Yeung, David Chui 
 
INFLUENCES ON ADOPTION OF CLOUD-BASED ERP SYSTEMS IN SMEs:  
THE TECHNOLOGICAL-ORGANIZATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK 370 
 
Tariq Bhatti 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT DECISION MAKING 281 
 
Yulius Kurnia Susanto, Arya Pradipta 
 
THE HARDEST CYCLE CLIMB AT TCC: A FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS CASE 387 
 
Josefine Boehm, Daniel Voll, Henning Zülch 
 
GOVERNANCE IN FAMILY BUSINESS: EMPIRICAL STUDY  
IN BUS TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 397 
 
Bambang Dwi Suseno, Christantius Dwiatmadja, Ahyar Yuniawan 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017, Continued -2 
 
315 
INDICATORS INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE AND STABILITY 
IN GCC BANKING SECTOR 408 
 
Majed Alharthi 
 
THE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGES:  
EVIDENCE FROM GHANA 421 
 
Andrews Owusu, Mark Holmes, Jacob Agyemang 
 
THE ROLE OF NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS IN  
THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 435 
 
Francesco Sotti 
 
BOARD CONFIGURATION AND IR ADOPTION.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN COMPANIES 444 
 
Simona Alfiero, Massimo Cane, Ruggiero Doronzo, Alfredo Esposito 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION IN FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY INNOVATIVE BUSINESSES 
 459 
Ana Beatriz Hernández Lara 
 
CORPORATE AND ACCOUNTING FRAUD:  
TYPES, CAUSES AND FRAUDSTER’S BUSINESS PROFILE 467 
 
Michalis Bekiaris, Georgios Papachristou 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS AND PAYOUT POLICY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GCC REGION 
 476 
Husam-Aldin Nizar Al-Malkawi 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
444 
BOARD CONFIGURATION AND IR 
ADOPTION. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM EUROPEAN COMPANIES 
 
Simona Alfiero 
*
, Massimo Cane 
**
,  
Ruggiero Doronzo 
*
, Alfredo Esposito 
*
 
 
* Department of Management, University of Torino, Italy 
** Corresponding author, Department of Management, University of Torino,  
Contact details: Department of Management, University of Torino, Corso Unione Sovietica, 218 bis, 10134 Turin, Italy 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms are obliged to disclose certain information in 
their annual reports in accordance with laws, 
regulations, and adopted accounting standards 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). This is the minimum 
level of disclosure required by the market so that 
any possible investor can formally assess the 
company. 
Voluntary disclosure, on the other hand, 
includes additional information that a company 
communicates beyond what is legally required (Ariff, 
2013). It gives investors a clear idea of a company’s 
economic viability (Boesso and Kumar, 2007) and 
reduces the so-called information asymmetry 
problem (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Disclosure is seen 
as the best way to communicate with investors (Ho 
and Wong, 2001) and transparency via disclosure 
and board monitoring are possible solutions to 
easing agency and asymmetric communication 
problems (Baumol and Bowman, 1965; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Quagli, 2004; Corsi et al., 2016). 
Nowadays, stakeholders manifest implicit and 
explicit information needs. Firstly, they need to 
understand what the new dynamics for value 
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Over the last few years, companies are increasingly international, 
and a growing number of stakeholders is affected by the 
sustainability aspects of business, resulting in significant changes 
in how corporate information is both perceived and published. 
This scenario has led to many company Boards of Directors (BoD) 
voluntarily adopting a new communication tool, known as 
Integrated Reporting, (IR) which is a single disclosure document 
that satisfies stakeholders’ increasing need for information. 
This study wants to contribute to existing literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance and IR, investigating if 
board configuration (size, gender, and average age) influences its 
adoption. 
The analysis relies on a sample of 1,047 companies from 18 
European countries for the year 2015. These results show a 
positive relationship between the decision to adopt IR and board 
size and female board members, whereas the older board 
members have a negative effect on it. 
Our findings present implications both from the theoretical and 
practical point of view. On a theoretical level, the research 
confirms that board diversity needs to be analysed more in detail, 
because of its contribution to company’s transparency. Moreover, 
the results provide to standard setters and regulators a useful 
insight of the important distinction among various board 
members’ features. 
 
Keywords: Disclosure, Integrated Reporting, Corporate Governance, 
Board Composition 
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creation are. Secondly, following the recent financial 
scandals, they need to be highly aware of the firms’ 
actions to maintain and increase trusting 
relationship. Eventually, they manifest greater 
sensitivity to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
issues. This has led to increased attention on 
corporate disclosure topics (D’Orio and Lombardo, 
2007).  
When and if the information is insufficient, 
investment decisions are taken subjectively instead 
of objectively and this can lead to market share 
prices fluctuations. Firms can consequently 
experience problems getting capital to finance their 
decisions or may incur a higher cost of capital 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Different theories try to explain why a firm 
should voluntarily disclose information. The agency 
theory argues that firms disclose information 
voluntarily in order to reduce agency costs and show 
that they are using company resources in 
shareholders’ best interests (Barako et al., 2006; 
Arshad et al., 2009). According to the signaling 
theory, the voluntary information helps firms to 
distinguish their performance from other 
competitors (Campbell et al., 2001), improve their 
reputation and attract new investment (Verrecchia, 
1983). Furthermore, the capital need theory, on the 
other hand, suggests that more voluntary disclosure 
helps companies obtain funds at a lower cost (Choi, 
1973). 
Even though voluntary disclosure is important, 
management has the final say (Chen and Jaggi, 2001) 
and it decides which - and how much - information 
is to be voluntarily disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report (Eng and Mak, 2003). Therefore, the presence 
of the company BoD is fundamental for monitoring 
the management’s decisions and ensuring that they 
disclose credible rather than self-serving voluntary 
information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). This will help 
the firm build a sound corporate disclosure system 
in the long term (Qu and Leung, 2006). 
A firm’s shareholders elect the BoD to govern 
and manage its business (Monks and Minow, 2008). 
As a primary corporate governance mechanism, it 
has an essential role in aligning management’s 
interests with shareholders (Bassen et al., 2006; 
Brennan, 2006). However, effective monitoring of the 
board is also determined by its composition 
(Mizruchi, 2004; Brick et al, 2006) which, in fact, is 
expected to affect the amount of voluntary 
disclosure. Board composition can be defined in 
various ways, including value system, nationality, 
gender, board size, industry background, etc. (Van 
der Walt et al., 2006; Kang et al, 2007). 
Stakeholders’ increasing need for more 
information has led to companies adopting various 
accounting methods beyond the traditional financial 
reporting: reports on management, governance, 
intellectual capital, and sustainability. On the other 
hand, providing stakeholders with large quantities 
of documents does not necessarily mean giving 
them a complete insight into the company’s affairs. 
So, a single communication tool giving clear 
financial and nonfinancial information was deemed 
necessary in order to inform stakeholders on 
company performance: IR framework. 
IR aims to replace the earlier dominant practice 
of separating financial and sustainability 
information through publishing a single integrated 
document (Lozano and Huisingh, 2011; Jensen and 
Berg, 2012; IIRC, 2013; Incollingo and Bianchi, 2016). 
The International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC) believes that integrating financial and 
sustainability information will better satisfy 
investors’ need for information by providing a 
complete picture of a company and its performance. 
The IIRC (2013) describes an IR as «bringing 
together material information about an 
organisation’s strategy, governance, performance 
and prospects in a way that reflects the commercial, 
social and environmental context within which it 
operates». 
This study focuses on the relationship between 
financial reporting and corporate governance and 
contributes to enriching studies of factors that could 
affect a company’s choice of IR as a disclosure 
document. It analyses the relationship between 
board diversity and the decision to adopt IR. Board 
diversity represents a significant corporate 
governance mechanism and, in particular, Ingley and 
Van der Walt (2003) describe diversity in corporate 
governance as board composition and the 
combination of individual members’ qualities, 
characteristics and expertise concerning board 
decision-making and other processes. 
In this study, “board composition” includes 
board size, gender, and member’s age, and our 
research investigates the effects of these 
characteristics when considering adopting IR. 
Unlike previous studies focused on analysing 
the effects of adopting IR, our research takes an 
upstream position checking whether certain board 
features influence the decision to adopt IR and - to 
the best of our knowledge – it is the first study of its 
kind. We believe that a deeper understanding of the 
factors influencing this decision is essential for 
academics, companies and - especially - policy-
makers. 
This paper starts with the theoretical 
background, then goes on to explain the data, 
methodology, and results, discussion and 
conclusions and concludes with limitations and 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. MAIN THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
IR can be considered an evolution of the 
sustainability report. It could represent an 
opportunity for increased transparency, governance 
and decision making for every type of profit or non-
profit organisation (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Adams 
et al., 2011; Carels et al., 2013). Sourcing and then 
publishing more information has not only decidedly 
had a positive effects on decision-making processes 
within a company, but also with investors and all 
stakeholders in general (Li and Qi, 2008). It should 
provide a briefer and more coherent, balanced 
picture of the company’s performance (Eccles and 
Krzus, 2010; Suttipun, 2017). 
Academic literature on the subject has little 
relevance and empiric research is still minimal. One 
of the most significant supporters of IR is Eccles 
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who analysed the issue back in 2010. His basic idea 
is that this new information tool could favour a 
change in company culture. Such studies have been 
carried out concerning similarities and differences 
between companies that draw up sustainability 
report and those that publish IR (Jensen and Berg, 
2012). 
In 2013, Owen looked into the origins and 
developments of IR, whereas other academics 
(Cheng et al., 2014) critically analysed key issues of 
the IIRC’s Framework Consultation Draft. Flower 
(2015) is one of the most critical arguing that the 
IIRC made a mistake in not forcing companies to 
add the negative impact of outside sources into the 
IR. 
A thorough and very interesting work was done 
by De Villiers et al. (2014) who discussed how 
reporting can be interpreted and applied in different 
ways. 
Stubbs and Higgins (2012) investigated internal 
mechanisms adopted in reporting processes in order 
to determine if IR stimulated better disclosure 
procedures. Some academics (Brown and Dillard, 
2014) criticised IR, maintaining it to be limited or 
biased. An interesting study carried out in the 
Netherlands (Van Bommel, 2014) acknowledged that 
the IR tool was able to enhance different values. 
Academics Haller and Van Staden (2014) highlighted 
the importance of giving information concerning the 
value created by the company and how it is 
distributed among all the stakeholders. 
Studies of factors that can condition IR 
practices have been carried out. In fact, Frias-
Aceituno et al. (2013) reported on the influence of 
the legal system and the composition of the board, 
while Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) recognised that 
culture is a fundamental factor. 
D’Este et al. (2013) carried out an interesting 
study about the choices of IR by groups concerning 
territorial interests. In fact, the research showed a 
positive relationship as those companies with 
stronger local roots were more inclined to publish 
their data. 
The information that has to be produced 
however can be quite a barrier for many 
organisations. Collecting, processing and publishing 
this information frequently incur further costs. 
Companies are also reluctant to publish too much 
data for fear of giving the competition strategic 
information (Adams and Simnett, 2011). So, this new 
tool offers a serious challenge to existing control 
processes (Adams et al., 2011) and an example is the 
concept of materiality. 
The relationship between corporate governance 
and the disclosure practice of companies have been 
widely analysed by the academic literature with 
particular focus on the corporate governance 
structure and the BoD’s characteristics (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Adams, 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; 
Ricart et al., 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; 
Raithatha and Bapat, 2014; Soliman et al., 2014; 
Samaha et al. 2015). The BoD, as the firm’s 
governing body, is responsible for safeguarding the 
interests of different stakeholders, for example 
through the dissemination of information, in order 
to reduce information-related problems and prevent 
opportunistic behaviour (Lev, 1992; Richardson and 
Welker, 2001). Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed 
a framework analysis in which a complementary or 
substitutive link was established between 
companies’ information disclosure practices and 
their internal mechanisms of corporate governance. 
The complementary relationship, theoretically, is 
based on the assumption that effective corporate 
governance strengthens a company’s internal 
control. Thus, more information is disclosed in 
order to reduce problems arising from opportunistic 
behaviour and information asymmetries. In a 
substitutive relation, the strength of corporate 
governance would prevent or reduce the disclosure 
of information to investors, as a result of the 
internal control mechanisms reliability. 
Based on the theoretical framework, we assume 
that there is a strong relationship between some 
board features and the adoption of IR. In fact, we 
assume the existence of a complementary 
relationship between board characteristics 
(measured by its size, women and average age) and 
the incentive for a firm to provide voluntary 
disclosure through IR. 
 
2.1. Board size 
 
Intellectual capital has become a key set of 
resources for gaining advantage in a business 
environment that has no geographic boundaries 
(Lev, 2004). In fact, the resource dependency theory 
argues that larger boards allow firms to bring 
diverse and vital intellectual resources onto the 
board as they can make decision-making effective 
and efficient, either directly or indirectly, as well as 
meet global challenges (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Kosnik, 1990; Parum, 2005). 
Monitoring and controlling management 
actions are the most important functions of the BoD 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). According to Gandia 
(2008), increasing the number of board members 
improves the capability of the board in monitoring 
and controlling management actions. This enhances 
the transparency and the disclosure of more 
information by management. Adam et al. (2005) 
argue that larger boards have varied experiences and 
dispersed opinions. This, in turn, increases their 
monitoring capacities and enhances the firm’s 
disclosure policies. Empirical evidence reported by 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) suggests that larger 
boards tend to be associated with greater levels of 
information disclosure. It is worth noting that the 
corporate governance code for publicly listed firms 
in Jordan, recommends a board with more than five 
members and less than fifteen for the industrial and 
services sectors (Jordan Securities Commission, 
2009). However, for the insurance sector, the code 
recommends a board of no less than seven members 
(Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2006). 
Large company boards are subject to more 
severe agency problems, and therefore monitoring 
processes are less optimal (Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; De Andrés et al., 2005). 
According to Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2011), the 
complexity of management control and of ensuring 
the accuracy of the information (including financial 
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information) provided, requires the presence of a 
considerable number of directors, with the 
experience and diversity required to successfully 
perform these supervisory functions. In this sense, 
better monitoring would result in the disclosure of 
larger volumes of information about the company. 
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship 
between the size of the board and information 
disclosure is contradictory. Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2010) observed a negative 
relationship. Pearce and Zahra (1992), Dalton et al. 
(1999), Larmou and Vafeas (2010) and Izzo and Fiori 
(2016) observed a positive relationship. 
A greater number of directors has a positive 
effect on the breadth and integration of corporate 
information provided because an IR requires the 
input of directors with different types of expertise. 
The occurrence of such a variety of viewpoints is 
likely to be more common in larger boards. 
Board size can add to a diversity of 
perspectives, offering greater choices of solutions 
and more decision criteria, in order to achieve the 
board’s goals and objectives on behalf of investors 
(Schweiger et al., 1986; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988; Flaherty et al., 2006). 
H1: Is there a positive relationship between BoD 
size and IR? 
 
2.2. Women 
 
The diversity of the BoD is defined as the disparity 
of the characteristics presented by its members 
(Robinson and Dechant, 1997). Commonly, studies 
including this feature have focused on the gender 
and nationality of directors (Gul et al., 2004; Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). 
Several authors have argued that the presence 
of women at senior management level positively 
influences company behaviour (Betz et al., 2013). 
These new behaviour patterns are often associated 
with greater information transparency, especially 
regarding sustainability issues (Barako and Brown, 
2008; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). 
Gender diversity is now one of the most 
challenging research issues as the numbers of 
women in top management and on corporate boards 
increase (Singh et al., 2001). Gender diversity may 
benefit a board’s decision-making process. New 
prospectives and ideas are presented and discussed 
(Alvarez and McCaffery, 2000). Diversity may also 
become a competitive advantage because it adds to 
the board’s knowledge base, creativity, and 
innovation (Watson et al., 1993). Empirical results by 
Huse and Solberg (2006) suggest that female 
directors are more interested in meetings than 
males, so they are more likely to make good 
decisions. Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that 
female directors have a strong effect on board input 
and output. They also have better attendance 
records than males and are more likely to join 
monitoring committees. 
Adams and Ferreira (2004) suggest that boards 
with more women directors are held more frequently 
and they have different board attendance patterns 
which make diverse boards more effective than 
homogenous boards. Adams and Ferreira (2004) 
argue that «women are intrinsically more 
“stabilising”» than men and Huse and Solberg (2006) 
concluded that women could contribute to boards 
by creating alliances, preparing and involving 
themselves in board matters, attending important 
decision-making spaces and being visible. 
Literature developed around corporate 
governance aspects suggests that women on boards 
and committees are more diligent when controlling, 
transparency and disclosure thus providing a better 
quality of earnings (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011). 
Gibbins et al. (1990) argue that board gender 
diversity may explain firms’ disclosure practices in 
their annual reports. 
About gender, a confound investigation factor 
arises from critical mass theory (Konrad et al., 2008). 
This theory suggests that when a certain threshold 
(Kramer et al., 2006) is reached (a “critical mass”) the 
impact of a subgroup (such as “women on the 
board”) becomes more noticeable (Pastore and 
Tommaso, 2016). Kramer et al. (2006) argue that «a 
board with three or more women is more likely to 
experience the positive effects and contributions to 
good governance than a board with fewer women». 
According to Kanter (1977), having only one member 
of a demographic group can lead to tokenism. 
Tokens are considered to represent an entire 
demographic group (women) and are seen by the 
dominant group (men) as a stereotype. Based on 
critical mass, research into the relationship between 
female directors and performance might require a 
distinction between boards with one woman and 
boards that have reached a certain threshold. This 
standardisation counteracts the “tokenism 
phenomena”, which implies that companies only 
include a few female board positions in order to 
satisfy external expectations (Torchia et al., 2011). 
H2: Is there a positive relationship between the 
presence of women on BoD and IR? 
 
2.3. Average age 
 
Dahya, Lonie and Power (1996) postulate that board 
experience will assist in making information more 
transparent as comparisons can be made based on 
knowledge of other organisations. Experienced 
directors are also more likely to have greater 
incentives to be effective monitors of management 
to safe-guard their reputation or improve their 
attractiveness on the labour market (Kaplan and 
Reishus, 1990). Directors with diverse bases of 
experience may improve board monitoring and 
decision making (Useem, 1993; Westphal and Milton, 
2000). 
Corporate boards monitor management 
decisions and behaviour and endeavour to add value 
through aligning management and investors’ 
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Del Brio et al., 
2006). Their effectiveness, however, in undertaking 
this role is influenced by many things including the 
directors’ personal characteristics i.e. gender, age, 
education and experience (Campbell and Minguez-
Vera, 2008; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Age 
represents an individual’s experience and risk-taking 
manner (Herrmann and Datta, 2005), so it can be 
assumed that as older directors have cumulative 
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experience, they may have a substantial impact on 
the firm’s performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Reed and Defillippi, 1990). Empirically, existing 
evidence does not support older directors, but it 
actually reports that younger directors outperform 
older ones (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Sonnenfeld, 
2002; Rose, 2005; Nakano and Nguyen, 2011). One 
possible explanation is that young directors are 
more open to change (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
and new ideas (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). They are 
also liable to take risks, are more innovative and 
more efficient in governance oversight (Grimm and 
Smith, 1991). 
H3: Is there a positive relationship between the 
increase in average age on BoD and IR? 
 
2.4. Control variables 
 
This paper uses established variables in governance 
studies that can influence disclosure for companies. 
They include whether a company is listed on the 
stock market, activity sector, corporate size, 
leverage, growth opportunities and profitability. 
Stock exchange listing influences firms to disclose 
more diverse information - financial, social and 
environmental - which is believed to be required by 
those markets, so it is likely to positively impact the 
quality of investors’ decisions (Ullmann, 1985). 
Multiple listed corporations raising capital on 
international markets will have higher levels of 
disclosure than domestically listed enterprises if 
overseas stock market requirements are greater than 
domestic exchanges. In fact, Cooke (1989) found this 
to be the case, and Singhvi and Desai (1971) and 
Choi (1973) also found that listing status was a 
significant explanatory variable. 
The activity sector is an additional documented 
explanatory factor of voluntary disclosure. Indeed, 
prior literature argues that companies from 
environmentally sensitive industries disclose more 
environmental information than less polluting 
companies, because of their significant impacts on 
the environment (Pahuja, 2009). 
A positive relation between the corporate size 
and the volume of data deliberately disclosed is 
reported by some scholars (Da Silva Monteiro and 
Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; Sotorrio and Fernandez-
Sanchez, 2010), while some others have discovered 
no factually noteworthy relationship (Khanna et al., 
2004; Ortiz and Clavel, 2006). 
In order to represent the leverage, the study 
relies on debt-equity ratio as per Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999). 
In order to point out information based on the 
growth, the study relies on the firms’ sales growth 
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). 
The profitability side is taken into account by 
including the return on assets variable (Larrán and 
Giner, 2002; Giner et al., 2003; Marston and Polei, 
2004; Prencipe, 2004). 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
To test these hypotheses, we have selected a total of 
1,047 European companies from 18 different 
countries, identifying those companies that adopted 
IR (n=78), following the IIRC standards, for year 
2015 and a random sample of companies that did 
not adopt the IR but only the mandatory financial 
report, for the same year (see Table 1). 
In order to identify companies that adopted IR 
according to the IIRC standards, we relied on the 
official list of the IIRC website. 
The comparison sample was determined by 
applying a stratification sampling procedure based 
on size, sector, and country characteristics of the 
“population” of the companies that adopt IR for the 
year 2015. 
To build the sample, we have relied on the 
Amadeus Database, verifying and double checking 
on corporate websites if the kind of disclosure tools 
utilised, from a content point of view, was 
comparable to the IR, even when different ways on 
naming reports were approached. 
An analysis of the disclosure tool has been 
carried out not only by a formal point of view (e.g. 
various way utilised on naming reports) but also 
from a substantial perspective. 
 
Table 1. Sample composition 
 
Country 
Companies 
presenting IR 
Companies 
no presenting IR 
UK 17 194 
Spain 12 138 
Netherlands 11 134 
Russia 7 104 
Italy 7 93 
France 5 67 
Germany 4 43 
Poland 3 23 
Finland 3 29 
Austria 1 11 
Belgium 1 15 
Bulgaria 1 15 
Switzerland 1 15 
Denmark 1 13 
Hungary 1 9 
Luxembourg 1 13 
Sweden 1 23 
Ukraine 1 30 
Total 78 969 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
66.76% of the sample is made up of unlisted 
companies and around 6% of them adopt IR as their 
disclosure document. 
Because the dependent variable is binary (equal 
to 1 if the company has developed IR, 0 if the 
company is not presenting it), this study uses 
logistic regression (Logit) (Vani Kant, 2001; Bajari et 
al., 2009) to test its hypotheses. Listed below are the 
dependent variable (IR), the three independent 
variables (board size, women and average age) and 
the six control variables (listed, size, leverage, 
growth sales, profitability, sector). 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
IR: 1 = the company has developed IR; 0 = the 
company is not presenting it 
 
Independent variables: 
 
BOARD SIZE: Number of directors on the board 
WOMEN: Percentage of women on the board 
AVERAGE AGE: Average age of board’s members 
 
Control variable: 
 
LISTED: 1 = listed company; 0 = no listed company 
SIZE: Log. Total Asset 
LEVERAGE: Debts/Equity 
SALES GROWTH: Growth measured over at least two 
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years sales growth 
PROFITABILITY: ROA 
ACTIVITY SECTOR: 10 dummies (Automotive, 
Business Support Services, Consulting, Electricity, 
Extraction, Healthcare, Oil, Retail Trade, 
Telecommunications and Transportation) 
 
Table 2. Summary of independent variables. 
 
Independent Variables Hypothesis Expected Sign 
Board Size H1 + 
Women H2 + 
Average Age H3 + 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
The Logit equation was as follows: 
 
 
 
We then transformed the IR dependent variable in terms of probability of the event: 
 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Tables 3 show summary statistics for the numerical 
variables for companies adopting IR, while Table 4 
presents the same information for those who do not 
adopt it. 
 
According to Table 3, the board size in 
companies with IR ranges between 1 and 35 
directors with an average size of approximately 
11.76 directors. Overall, female directors make up 
20.38% of the total directors. The average age of 
directors is approximately 55 years old. 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for companies presenting IR 
 
 
Obs. Min Max Mean SD Skew. Kurt. 
Board size 78 1 35 11.76 8.496 0.668 - 0.168 
% Women 78 0 100 20.38 18.39 1.387 3.807 
Average age 78 37 69.18 54.93 6.10 -0.212 0.330 
Size 78 3.11 9.64 6.33 1.27 -0.618 0.295 
Leverage 78 0.12 76.26 7.09 15.76 3.20 9.675 
Sales Growth 78 -0.38 70.71 0.99 8 8.80 77.637 
ROA 78 -34.01 51.12 6.70 11.47 1.44 7.130 
Source: own elaboration 
 
According to Table 4, the board size in 
companies without IR ranges between 1 and 57 
directors with an average size of approximately 
10.66 directors. Overall, female directors make up 
15.09% of the total directors. The average age of 
directors is approximately 55 years old. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics for companies not presenting IR 
 
 
Obs. Min Max Mean SD Skew. Kurt. 
Board size 969 1 57 10.66 8.87 1.150 1.388 
% Women 969 0 100 15.09 17.85 1.720 4.451 
Average age 969 30.66 86 55.18 6.22 0.019 1.204 
Size 969 2.52 11.65 6.73 0.77 -0.242 5.631 
Leverage 969 -4.83 86.12 34.79 31.25 21.88 9.417 
Sales Growth 969 -0.99 100.41 11.56 3.34 31.02 124.620 
ROA 969 -77.47 91.58 4.63 10.57 1.49 19.562 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of dummy variables for the whole sample (part 1) 
 
 Dummies Variables 
IR Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 78 7.4 
Non-sensitive (0) 969 92.6 
Total 1,047 100 
Listed Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 351 33.5 
Non-sensitive (0) 696 66.5 
Total 1,047 100 
 
 
𝐼𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2%𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + µ 
(1) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃/(1 − 𝑃))
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2%𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽 3 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽8 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + µ 
(2) 
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Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of dummy variables for the whole sample (part 2) 
 
 Dummies Variables 
Automotive Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 122 11.7 
Non-sensitive (0) 925 88.3 
Total 1,047 100 
Business Support Services Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 32 3.1 
Non-sensitive (0) 1,015 96.9 
Total 1,047 100 
Consulting Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 162 15.5 
Non-sensitive (0) 885 84.5 
Total 1,047 100 
Electricity Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 99 9.5 
Non-sensitive (0) 948 90.5 
Total 1,047 100 
Extraction Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 38 3.6 
Non-sensitive (0) 1,009 96.4 
Total 1,047 100 
Healthcare Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 7 0.7 
Non-sensitive (0) 1,040 99.3 
Total 1,047 100 
Oil Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 54 5.2 
Non-sensitive (0) 993 94.8 
Total 1,047 100 
Retail Trade Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 246 23.5 
Non-sensitive (0) 801 76.5 
Total 1,047 100 
Telecommunic. Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 247 23.6 
Non-sensitive (0) 800 76.4 
Total 1,047 100 
Transportation Frequency Valid Percentage 
Sensitive (1) 40 3.8 
Non-sensitive (0) 1,007 96.2 
Total 1,047 100 
Source: own elaboration 
 
4.2. Board composition and IR 
 
The result of the bivariate correlation analysis 
between independent variables shows that the 
highest value of the Spearman correlation 
coefficients (r) is 0.400. The coefficients are 
significant at different levels of confidence and the 
values are not very high. 
According to Table 7, the model has an R2 of 
Cox and Snell is 0.0454 On the other hand, the Chi-
square test is found to be statistically significant 
(Chi2=48.13, ρ=0.000,). This means that the model 
explains almost 99% of the variation in the voluntary 
disclosure amongst sampled firms. The VIF test 
suggests that the model does not suffer from any 
multicollinearity problem where the VIF of all 
variables ranges between 1.008 and 1.545. 
The most significant variables are: % WOMEN 
and SIZE. 
A summary of the results of the correlation 
analysis performed on the model is presented in 
Table 6. 
Table 7 shows a positive relationship between 
the BOARD SIZE and the adopting of IR (β
1
=.019). 
This means that as more directors are added to the 
board, its monitoring capacity increases and thus 
more information is disclosed. The relationship is 
found to be significant (ρ=.198). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Table 7 also shows that the coefficient of % 
WOMEN is positive as expected (β
2
=.018) and 
statistically it is significant (ρ=.003). 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
The relationship between directors’ AVERAGE 
AGE and IR is found to be negative and insignificant 
(β
4
=-.012, ρ=.55), this means that firms with 
corporate boards made up of younger directors 
disclose more information and they are more likely 
to adopt IR. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
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Table 6. Correlation matrix 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 IR 
1 
                  
0.000 
                  
2 BOARD SIZE 
0.033 1 
                 
0.293 0.000 
                 
3 % WOMEN 
0.077* .179** 1 
                
0.012 0.000 0.000 
                
4 AVERAGE AGE 
-0.011 .190** 0.060 1 
               
0.728 0.000 0.054 0.000 
               
5 Listed 
0.060 .400** .103** .131** 1 
              
0.050 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
              
6 Size 
-.128** .315** .127** .105** .245** 1 
             
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
             
7 Leverage  
-0.013 0.010 -0.018 -0.027 -0.035 0.020 1 
            
0.686 0.736 0.569 0.376 0.256 0.520 0.000 
            
8 Sales Growth 
-0.009 -0.036 -0.023 0.036 -0.024 -0.042 -0.001 1 
           
0.781 0.246 0.452 0.239 0.447 0.171 0.982 0.000 
           
9 ROA 
0.051 0.019 0.010 0.005 0.034 -0.032 -.063* -0.017 1 
          
0.099 0.537 0.754 0.873 0.271 0.302 0.041 0.580 0.000 
          
10 Extraction 
0.042 .080** -0.025 0.035 0.057 .092** -0.010 -0.006 0.036 1 
         
0.173 0.010 0.420 0.257 0.066 0.003 0.742 0.848 0.251 0.000 
         
11 Oil 
0.033 0.042 -0.011 0.007 -0.010 -0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.002 -0.045 1 
        
0.293 0.175 0.723 0.814 0.744 0.372 0.710 0.801 0.956 0.143 0.000 
        
12 Automotive 
0.010 -0.037 -0.052 0.010 0.007 -0.011 0.050 -0.012 -0.030 -.070* -.085** 1 
       
0.738 0.237 0.091 0.735 0.823 0.729 0.104 0.700 0.336 0.023 0.006 0.000 
       
13 Electricity 
0.033 -0.001 -.072* -.066* 0.006 -0.004 -0.013 -0.011 0.010 -.063* -.075* -.117** 1 
      
0.292 0.986 0.020 0.032 0.856 0.896 0.665 0.727 0.739 0.042 0.015 0.000 0.000 
      
14 Retail Trade 
-.063* -.067* -0.014 -0.047 -.098** -.139** -0.022 -0.015 0.013 -.108** -.129** -.201** -.179** 1 
     
0.042 0.029 0.658 0.131 0.002 0.000 0.483 0.639 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
15 Transportation 
-0.019 0.055 .077* 0.030 .070* .069* -0.008 -0.006 0.059 -0.039 -0.046 -.072* -.064* -.110** 1 
    
0.548 0.073 0.013 0.330 0.024 0.026 0.793 0.835 0.058 0.211 0.133 0.019 0.037 0.000 0.000 
    
16 Telecommunic. 
0.005 -0.046 -0.007 0.017 -0.051 -0.002 -0.023 0.056 -0.036 -.108** -.130** -.202** -.180** -.308** -.111** 1 
   
0.868 0.134 0.809 0.592 0.096 0.939 0.459 0.073 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
17 Consulting 
-0.021 .071* .082** 0.048 .144** .155** 0.041 -0.014 -0.025 -.083** -.100** -.155** -.138** -.237** -.085** -.238** 1 
  
0.501 0.022 0.008 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.647 0.415 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
  
18 
Business Support 
Services 
0.034 -0.013 0.047 -0.028 -0.056 -.061* -0.007 -0.006 0.036 -0.034 -0.041 -.064* -0.057 -.098** -0.035 -.099** -.076* 1 
 
0.270 0.674 0.126 0.359 0.072 0.050 0.827 0.848 0.243 0.265 0.181 0.037 0.063 0.001 0.253 0.001 0.014 0.000 
 
19 Healthcare 
0.021 0.024 0.019 0.031 -0.058 -.067* -0.012 -0.003 0.010 -0.016 -0.019 -0.030 -0.027 -0.045 -0.016 -0.046 -0.035 -0.015 1 
0.490 0.445 0.543 0.311 0.059 0.030 0.710 0.931 0.740 0.607 0.536 0.335 0.391 0.142 0.597 0.140 0.256 0.638 0.000 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: The first number is the correlation coefficient. The second number is the p-value of significance of the correlation coefficient. 
Source: own elaboration.
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Table 7. Results for the model Logit 
 
 B S.E. Wald Gl Sign. Exp(B) 
Board Size  .019 .015 1.659 1 .198 1.019 
% Women .018 .006 9.032 1 .003 1.018 
Average Age -.012 .021 .343 1 .558 .988 
Listed .724 .281 6.643 1 .010 2.063 
Size -.748 .143 27.313 1 .000 .473 
Leverage  .000 .001 .033 1 .855 1.000 
Sales Growth  .000 .003 .019 1 .889 1.000 
ROA  .013 .009 1.957 1 .162 1.013 
Automotive .112 1.249 .008 1 .929 1.118 
Bus. Supp. Serv. .046 1.318 .001 1 .972 1.047 
Consulting -.269 1.254 .046 1 .830 .764 
Electricity .337 1.252 .072 1 .788 1.400 
Extraction .784 1.306 .361 1 .548 2.191 
Oil .350 1.277 .075 1 .784 1.418 
Retail Trade -.758 1.235 .377 1 .539 .469 
Telecommunic. -.057 1.220 .002 1 .962 .944 
Transportion -.685 1.412 .236 1 .627 .504 
Costant 2.277 1.784 1.630 1 .202 9.750 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Data analysis went ahead transforming the 
Logit results to probability terms. That is, the 
probability to adopt an IR compared to the average 
value was calculated for each independent variable 
and then the variations were determined in terms of 
probability following an increase or decrease in the 
average value of these variables. 
The graphs below clearly show - for each 
variable - the variation of the probability to adopt an 
IR as board characteristics vary. 
 
Figure 1. Probability of adopting IR compared to independent variables 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
These results show that companies with a 
larger BoD are 1.02 times more likely to adopt IR 
compared to companies with a smaller board, 
Expo(B)=1.02. Those boards with eleven members 
have a likelihood of 92% to adopt IR as disclosure 
tool and with one extra board member, the 
likelihood increases by 0.27%. Adding women to the 
board results in an increase of the probability of a 
company adopting IR (odds ratio=1.018, p<.005). 
Companies, where women represent 18% of board 
members, record a 93.09% probability of adopting IR 
and it increases by 2.32% following a 10% rise of 
female board members. An average age of 55 
corresponds to a probability of 83.44% which goes 
down to 83.27% when the average age is one year 
older, i.e. 56 years old. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Over the last few years, increasing numbers of 
companies have been giving more attention to 
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processes that create value. They have voluntarily 
decided to adopt IR which is an efficient disclosure 
tool used for communicating with stakeholders as 
well as being an accounting tool for measuring a 
company’s social sustainability and economic 
growth in the medium and long-term. IR, then, is a 
form of communication made up of numbers and 
qualitative information with the aim of keeping 
stakeholders up to date. This paper’s objective is to 
analyse how certain characteristics of board 
composition influence its decision to adopt IR. The 
study examined 1,047 European companies from 
different sectors for the year 2015. 
The results highlighted a positive relationship 
between adopting IR and the size of the BoD and 
female board members. Companies with larger 
boards are more inclined to adopt this new 
document because they can count on greater 
resources for sourcing and publishing this data (Lev, 
2004). They are also more likely to publish non-
financial data in order to satisfy investors’ requests 
for information (Garcia-Sanchez, 2013). 
Promoting gender diversity on the board is 
likely to impact positively on the voluntary provision 
of holistic information and thus improve 
stakeholder engagement. This effect is generalised, 
whereby reducing the imperative to mandate such 
disclosure, as well as the influence of legal and 
cultural systems that characterise the company’s 
country of origin (Fernandez-Reijo et al., 2014). 
The research showed a significant relationship 
between the average age of the BoD and IR. 
Our findings present implications both from 
the theoretical and practical point of view. On a 
theoretical level, the study confirms that board 
diversity needs to be analysed more in detail, 
because of its contribution to company’s 
transparency. Moreover, the results provide to 
corporate governance standard setters and 
regulators a useful insight of the important 
distinction among various board members’ features. 
 
6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE AVENUES OF THE 
RESEARCH 
 
The study has several limitations: 
 Other variables capturing different aspects 
other than corporate governance could be 
included. 
 Different factors, such as strategy decisions, 
communication policies and regulatory/legal 
backgrounds, could be considered. 
 The analysis could be conducted on a wider 
sample. 
We believe that a deeper understanding of the 
factors influencing the decision of adopting IR is 
essential for academics, companies and - especially - 
policy-makers, considering that this kind of 
disclosure develops the integrated thinking, 
improves the quality of information available to the 
providers of financial capital. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Adams, C. (2015). Understanding integrated 
reporting: The concise guide to integrated thinking 
and the future of corporate reporting. London, UK: 
Do Sustainability. 
2. Adams, C. A. (2002). Internal organisational 
factors influencing corporate social and ethical 
reporting: Beyond current theorising. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(2), 223-250. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570210418905 
3. Adams, J. C., King, D., Pendlebury Hook, D., & 
Wilsdon, J. (2011). Global research report: Middle 
East: Exploring the changing landscape of Arabian, 
Persian and Turkish research. Leeds, UK: 
Evidence/Thomson Reuters. 
4. Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the 
boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 
94(2), 291-309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
jfineco.2008.10.007 
5. Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2004). Gender 
diversity in the boardroom. (Finance Working 
Paper, 57). European corporate governance 
institute. 
6. Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). 
Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate 
performance. Review of financial studies, 18(4), 
1403-1432. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhi030 
7. Adams, S., & Simnett, R. (2011). Integrated 
reporting: An opportunity for Australia’s not for 
profit sector. Australian Accounting Review, 21(3), 
292-301. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1835-2561. 
2011.00143.x 
8. Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2012). The changing 
of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of 
mandated female board representation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 137-197. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr049 
9. Ahmed, K., & Courtis, J. K. (1999). Associations 
between corporate characteristics and disclosure 
levels in annual reports: A meta-analysis. The 
British Accounting Review, 31(1), 35-61. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.1998.0082 
10. Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2013). Corporate boards, 
audit committees and voluntary disclosure: 
Evidence from Italian listed companies. Journal of 
Management & Governance, 17(1), 187-216. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3 
11. Alvarez, R. M., & McCaffery, E. J. (2000). Is there a 
gender gap in fiscal political preferences? (Paper 
No. 5). USC Law School. 
12. Ariff, A. A. (2013). Governance and voluntary 
disclosure of intangibles. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 11(1), 600-610. https://doi.org/10.22495 
/cocv11i1c6art6 
13. Arshad, R., Atan, R., & Darus, F. (2009). Board 
structure, institutional pressures and corporate 
voluntary disclosure. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 6(3), 360-370. https://doi.org/10.22495/ 
cocv6i3c3p2 
14. Ayuso, S., & Argandoña, A. (2009). Responsible 
corporate governance: Towards a stakeholder 
board of directors? (Working Paper WP no 701). 
IESE Business School, University of Navarra. 
15. Bajari, P., Fox, J., & Ryan, S. P. (2009). The random 
coefficients logit model is identified. Journal of 
Econometrics, 166(2), 204-212. doi:10.1016/j. 
jeconom.2011.09.002  
16. Barako, D. G., & Brown, A. M. (2008). Corporate 
social reporting and board representation: 
evidence from the Kenyan banking sector. Journal 
of Management & Governance, 12(4), 309. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9053-x 
17. Barako, D. G., Hancock, P., & Izan, H. Y. (2006). 
Factors influencing voluntary corporate disclosure 
by Kenyan companies. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 14(2), 107-125. https:// 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
454 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00491.x 
18. Bassen, A., Kleinschmidt, M., & Zöllner, C. (2006). 
Corporate governance of German growth 
companies. Empirical analysis of the corporate 
governance quality and the structure of 
supervisory boards of companies listed on TEC-
DAX. Corporate Ownership & Control, 3(3), 128-
137. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3p10 
19. Baumol, W. J., & Bowen, W. G. (1965). On the 
performing arts: the anatomy of their economic 
problems. The American Economic Review, 
55(1/2), 495-502. 
20. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the 
relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. 
Accounting review, 71(4), 443-465. 
21. Berry, W. D., & Feldman, S. (1985). Multiple 
regressions in practice. USA: Sage. http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412985208 
22. Betz, M., O’Connell, L., & Shepard, J. M. (2013). 
Gender differences in proclivity for unethical 
behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 2, 427-432.  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4126-3_20 
23. Boesso, G., & Kumar, K. (2007). Drivers of 
corporate voluntary disclosure: A framework and 
empirical evidence from Italy and the United 
States. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 20(2), 269-296. https://doi.org/10.1108 
/09513570710741028 
24. Brennan, N. (2006). Boards of directors and firm 
performance: Is there an expectations gap? 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
14(6), 577-593. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2006.00534.x 
25. Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006). CEO 
compensation, director compensation, and firm 
performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12(3), 403-423. https:// 
doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.005 
26. Brown, J., & Dillard, J. (2014). Integrated reporting: 
On the need for broadening out and opening up. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
27(7), 1120-1156. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-
04-2013-1313 
27. Campbell, D., Shrives, P., & Bohmbach-Saager, H. 
(2001). Voluntary disclosure of mission 
statements in corporate annual reports: Signaling 
what and to whom? Business and society review, 
106(1), 65-87. https://doi.org/10.1111/0045-
3609.00102 
28. Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. (2008). Gender 
diversity in the boardroom and firm financial 
performance. Journal of business ethics, 83(3), 435-
451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9630-y 
29. Carels, C., Maroun, W., & Padia, N. (2013). 
Integrated reporting in the South African mining 
sector. Corporate Ownership & Control, 11(1), 991-
1005. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1c11p6 
30. Chen, C. J., & Jaggi, B. (2001). Association between 
independent non-executive directors, family 
control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. 
Journal of Accounting and Public policy, 19(4), 285-
310.  
31. Eccles, R. G., Cheng, B., & Saltzman, D. (Eds.). 
(2010). The landscape of integrated reporting. 
Reflections and next steps. Boston: Harvard 
Business Review. 
32. Cheng, E. C., & Courtenay, S. M. (2006). Board 
composition, regulatory regime and voluntary 
disclosure. The international journal of 
accounting, 41(3), 262-289. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.003 
33. Cheng, M., Green, W., Conradie, P., Konishi, N., & 
Romi, A. (2014). The international integrated 
reporting framework: key issues and future 
research opportunities. Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, 25(1), 90-
119. https://doi.org/10.1111/jifm.12015 
34. Choi, F. D. (1973). Financial disclosure and entry to 
the European capital market. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 11(2), 159-175. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2490187 
35. Churet, C., & Eccles, R. G. (2014). Integrated 
reporting, quality of management, and financial 
performance. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 26(1), 56-64. 
36. Cooke, T. E. (1989). Disclosure in the corporate 
annual reports of Swedish companies. Accounting 
and business research, 19(74), 113-124. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1989.9728841 
37. Cooke, T. E. (1992). The impact of size, stock 
market listing and industry type on disclosure in 
the annual reports of Japanese listed corporations. 
Accounting and Business Research, 22(87), 229-
237. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1992.972 
9440 
38. Corsi, K., Magnaghi, E., & Mancini, D. (2016). 
Tradizione e innovazione della comunicazione 
non finanziaria: la prontezza delle società quotate 
all’adozione della direttiva 2014/95/UE. 
Pubblicazioni SIDREA, 3. 
39. D’Este, C., Fellegara, A., Galli, D., & di Piacenza, G. 
(2013). Livelli di disclosure economico-finanziaria 
e scelte di integrated reporting nei gruppi a 
connotazione territoriale. Paper presented at the 
XXXVI AIDEA Conference. The Firms Role in 
Economy. Does a Growth-Oriented Business Model 
Exist, 1-26. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.aidea2013.it/docs/348_aidea2013_eco
nomia-aziendale.pdf 
40. D’Orio, G., & Lombardo, R. (2007). Corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility in 
Italy: Advantages and disadvantages of a non-
explicitly-existent system. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 4(4), 36-49. https://doi.org/10.22495 
/cocv4i4c4p4 
41. Da Silva Monteiro, S. M., & Aibar-Guzmán, B. 
(2010). Determinants of environmental disclosure 
in the annual reports of large companies operating 
in Portugal. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 17(4), 185-204. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.197 
42. Dahya, J., Lonie, A. A., & Power, D. M. (1996). The 
case for separating the roles of chairman and CEO: 
An analysis of stock market and accounting data. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
4(2), 71-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.1996.tb00136.x 
43. Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & 
Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy 
of Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256988 
44. De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). 
Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size, 
composition, functioning and effectiveness. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
13(2), 197-210. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2005.00418.x 
45. De Villiers, C., Rinaldi, L., & Unerman, J. (2014). 
Integrated Reporting: Insights, gaps and an agenda 
for future research. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 27(7), 1042-1067. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-06-2014-1736 
46. Del Brio, E. B., Maia-Ramires, E., & Perote, J. (2006). 
Corporate governance mechanisms and their 
impact on firm value. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 4(1), 25-36. https://doi.org/10.22495/ 
cocv4i1p2 
47. Eccles, R. G., & Krzus, M. P. (2010). Integrated 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
455 
reporting for a sustainable strategy: One Report 
has the potential to significantly change how 
companies operate and investors think, shifting 
the focus from that of meeting short-term 
financial goals to developing a long-term business 
strategy that not only makes a commitment to 
corporate social responsibility, but also to a 
sustainable society. Financial executive, 26(2), 28-
33. 
48. Eccles, R. G., & Krzus, M. P. (2010). One report: 
Integrated reporting for a sustainable strategy. 
USA, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119199960.ch1 
49. Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). 
Larger board size and decreasing firm value in 
small firms. Journal of financial economics, 48(1), 
35-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(98)00003-8 
50. Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bourgeois, L. J. (1988). Politics 
of strategic decision making in high velocity 
environments: Towards a midrange theory. 
Academy of Management Journal, 32, 543-577. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256434 
51. Eng, L. L., & Mak, Y. T. (2003). Corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of 
accounting and public policy, 22(4), 325-345. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-4254(03)00037-1 
52. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency 
problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26(2), 327-349. https://doi.org/ 
10.1086/467038 
53. Fernandez-Reijo, B., Romero, S., & Ruiz-Blanco, S. 
(2014). Women on boards: do they affect 
sustainability reporting? Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
21(6), 351-364. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1329 
54. Fields, M. A., & Keys, P. Y. (2003). The emergence 
of corporate governance from Wall St. to Main St.: 
Outside directors, board diversity, earnings 
management, and managerial incentives to bear 
risk. Financial Review, 38(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/1540-6288.00032 
55. Firth, M. (1979). The impact of size, stock market 
listing, and auditors on voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports. Accounting and Business 
Research, 9(36), 273-280. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
00014788.1979.9729168 
56. Flaherty, S., Li, J., & Small, K. (2006). Evidence on 
board size and information asymmetry: a capital 
markets perspective. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 4(2), 248-256. 
57. Flower, J. (2015). The international integrated 
reporting council: a story of failure. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 27, 1-17. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2014.07.002 
58. Frias-Aceituno, J. V., Rodriguez-Ariza, L., & Garcia‐
Sanchez, I. M. (2013). The role of the board in the 
dissemination of integrated corporate social 
reporting. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 20(4), 219-233. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1294 
59. Gallego-Alvarez, I., Manuel Prado-Lorenzo, J., & 
Garcia-Sanchez, I. M. (2011). Corporate social 
responsibility and innovation: a resource-based 
theory. Management Decision, 49(10), 1709-1727. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/00251741111183843 
60. Gandia, J. L. (2008). Determinants of internet-
based corporate governance disclosure by Spanish 
listed companies. Online Information Review, 
32(6), 791-817. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
14684520810923944 
61. Garcia-Sanchez, I. M., Rodriguez-Ariza, L., & Frias-
Aceituno, J. V. (2013). The cultural system and 
integrated reporting. International Business 
Review, 22(5), 828-838. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2013.01.007 
62. Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. (1993). Additional 
evidence on the association between the 
investment opportunity set and corporate 
financing, dividend, and compensation policies. 
Journal of Accounting and economics, 16(1-3), 125-
160. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101 
(93)90007-3 
63. Gibbins, M., Richardson, A., & Waterhouse, J. 
(1990). The management of corporate financial 
disclosure: opportunism, ritualism, policies, and 
processes. Journal of accounting research, 28(1), 
121-143. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491219 
64. Giner Inchausti, B., Arce Gisbert, M., Cervera 
Millán, N., & Ruiz llopis, A. (2003). Incentivos para 
la divulgación voluntaria de información: 
evidencia empírica sobre la información 
segmentada. Revista Europea de Dirección y 
Economía de la Empresa, 12(4), 69-86. 
65. Grimm, C. M., & Smith, K. G. (1991). Research 
notes and communications management and 
organizational change: A note on the railroad 
industry. Strategic Management Journal, 12(7), 
557-562. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.42501 20708 
66. Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2003). Basic 
econometrics (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
67. Gul, F. A., & Leung, S. (2004). Board leadership, 
outside directors’ expertise and voluntary 
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting and 
public Policy, 23(5), 351-379. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001 
68. Haller, A., & van Staden, C. (2014). The value 
added statement–an appropriate instrument for 
Integrated Reporting. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 27(7), 1190-1216. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-04-2013-1307 
69. Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper 
echelons: The organization as a reflection of its 
top managers. Academy of management review, 
9(2), 193-206. https://doi.org/10.2307/258434 
70. Hassan, A., & Ibrahim, E. (2012). Corporate 
environmental information disclosure: factors 
influencing companies’ success in attaining 
environmental awards. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
19(1), 32-46. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.278 
71. Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information 
asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital 
markets: A review of the empirical disclosure 
literature. Journal of accounting and economics, 
31(1), 405-440. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-
4101(01)00018-0 
72. Heidrick. & Struggles (2014). Towards dynamic 
governance 2014. European Corporate Governance 
Report. 
73. Herrmann, P., & Datta, D. K. (2005). Relationships 
between top management team characteristics and 
international diversification: An empirical 
investigation. British Journal of Management, 
16(1), 69-78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8551.2005.00429.x 
74. Ho, S. S., & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the 
relationship between corporate governance 
structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, 10(2), 139-156. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
S1061-9518(01)00041-6 
75. Huse, M., & Grethe Solberg, A. (2006). Gender-
related boardroom dynamics: How Scandinavian 
women make and can make contributions on 
corporate boards. Women in Management Review, 
21(2), 113-130. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
09649420610650693 
76. IIRC (2011). Towards integrated reporting. 
Communicating value in the 21st Century. IIRC. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
456 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
www.theiirc.org. 
77. IIRC (2013). The international <IR> Frameworks. 
Retrieved from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.theiirc.org. 
78. Inchausti, B. G. (1997). The influence of company 
characteristics and accounting regulation on 
information disclosed by Spanish firms. European 
accounting review, 6(1), 45-68. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/096381897336863 
79. Incollingo, A., & Bianchi, M. (2016). The 
connectivity of information in integrated 
reporting. Empirical evidence from international 
context. Financial Reporting, 2. DOI: 10.3280/ 
FR2016-002003 
80. Ingley, C. B., & Van der Walt, N. T. (2003). Board 
configuration: building better boards. Corporate 
Governance: The international journal of business 
in society, 3(4), 5-17. https://doi.org/ 
10.1108/14720700310497078 
81. Izzo M.F., Fiori G. (2016) The influence of 
corporate governance on the adoption of the 
integrated report: A first study on IIRC pilot 
programme. In Mio C. (ed.), Integrated reporting 
(pp. 155-179). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55149-8_9 
82. Jensen, J. C., & Berg, N. (2012). Determinants of 
traditional sustainability reporting versus 
integrated reporting. An institutionalist approach. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 21(5), 299-
316. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.740 
83. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of 
the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial 
economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
0304-405X(76)90026-X 
84. Kang, H., Cheng, M., & Gray, S. J. (2007). Corporate 
governance and board composition: Diversity and 
independence of Australian boards. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 194-
207. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007. 
00554.x 
85. Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and women of the 
corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
86. Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1996). Using the 
balanced scorecard as a strategic management 
system. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from 
the World Wide Web: https://hbr.org 
87. Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside 
directorships and corporate performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 27(2), 389-410. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90061-4 
88. Khan, H. U. Z. (2010). The effect of corporate 
governance elements on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting: Empirical evidence 
from private commercial banks of Bangladesh. 
International Journal of Law and Management, 
52(2), 82-109. https://doi.org/10.1108/1754243 
1011029406 
89. Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). 
Disclosure practices of foreign companies 
interacting with US markets. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 42(2), 475-508. https://doi.org 
/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00146.x 
90. Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V., & Erkut, S. (2008). 
Critical mass: The impact of three or more women 
on corporate boards. Organizational dynamics, 
37(2), 145-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn. 
2008.02.005 
91. Kosnik, R. D. (1990). Effects of board demography 
and directors' incentives on corporate greenmail 
decisions. Academy of Management journal, 33(1), 
129-150. https://doi.org/10.2307/256355 
92. Kramer, V. W., Konrad, A. M., Erkut, S., & Hooper, 
M. J. (2006). Critical mass on corporate boards: 
Why three or more women enhance governance. 
Boston: Wellesley Centers for Women. 
93. Larmou, S., & Vafeas, N. (2010). The relation 
between board size and firm performance in firms 
with a history of poor operating performance. 
Journal of Management & Governance, 14(1), 61. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9091-z 
94. Larrán, M., & Giner, B. (2002). The use of the 
Internet for corporate reporting by Spanish 
companies. International Journal of Digital 
Accounting Research, 2(1), 53-82. https://doi.org 
/10.4192/1577-8517-v2_3 
95. Lev, B. (1992). Information disclosure strategy. 
California Management Review, 34(4), 9-32. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/41166701 
96. Lev, B. (2004). Sharpening the intangibles edge. 
Harvard business review, 6, 109-116. 
97. Li, H., & Qi, A. (2008). Impact of corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosure in Chinese 
listed companies. Corporate Ownership & Control, 
5(2), 360-366. 
98. Lim, S., Matolcsy, Z., & Chow, D. (2007). The 
association between board composition and 
different types of voluntary disclosure. European 
Accounting Review, 16(3), 555-583. https:// 
doi.org/10.1080/09638180701507155 
99. Lozano, R., & Huisingh, D. (2011). Inter-linking 
issues and dimensions in sustainability reporting. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 19(2), 99-107. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2010.01.004 
100. Marston, C., & Polei, A. (2004). Corporate reporting 
on the Internet by German companies. 
International Journal of Accounting Information 
Systems, 5(3), 285-311. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.accinf.2004.02.009 
101. Mizruchi, M. S. (2004). Berle and Means revisited: 
The governance and power of large US 
corporations. Theory and Society, 33(5), 579-617. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000045757.939
10.ed 
102. Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (2008). Corporate 
governance. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley. 
103. Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2011). Do older boards 
affect firm performance? An empirical analysis 
based on Japanese firms. Hitotsubashi University. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879825 
104. Ortiz, E., & Clavel, J. G. (2006). Índices de 
revelación de información: Una propuesta de 
mejora de la metodología. Aplicación a la 
información sobre recursos humanos incluida en 
los Informes 20F. Spanish Journal of Finance and 
Accounting/Revista Española de Financiación y 
Contabilidad, 35(128), 87-113. 
105. Owen G. (2013). Integrated Reporting: A review of 
developments and their implications for the 
accounting curriculum. Accounting Education: An 
International Journal, 22(4), 340-356. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09639284.2013.817798 
106. Pahuja, S. (2009). Relationship between 
environmental disclosures and corporate 
characteristics: A study of large manufacturing 
companies in India. Social Responsibility Journal, 
5(2), 227-244. https://doi.org/10.1108/17471110 
910964504 
107. Parum, E. (2005). Does disclosure on corporate 
governance lead to openness and transparency in 
how companies are managed? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 13(5), 702-
709. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005. 
00461.x 
108. Pastore, P., & Tommaso, S. (2016). Women on 
corporate boards. The case of ‘gender quotas’ in 
Italy. Corporate Ownership & Control, 13(4), 132-
155. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4p13 
109. Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
457 
composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective. Journal of management studies, 29(4), 
411-438. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1992.tb00672.x 
110. Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external 
control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective. New York: Harper and Row. 
111. Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of 
corporate boards of directors: The organization 
and its environment. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 17(2), 218-228. https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/2393956 
112. Pfeffer, J. (1973). Size, composition, and function 
of hospital boards of directors: A study of 
organization-environment linkage. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 18(2), 349-364. https:// 
doi.org/10.2307/2391668 
113. Prado-Lorenzo, J. M., & Garcia-Sanchez, I. M. 
(2010). The role of the board of directors in 
disseminating relevant information on greenhouse 
gases. Journal of business ethics, 97(3), 391-424. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0515-0 
114. Prado‐Lorenzo, J. M., Gallego‐Alvarez, I., & Garcia‐
Sanchez, I. M. (2009). Stakeholder engagement and 
corporate social responsibility reporting: The 
ownership structure effect. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
16(2), 94-107. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.189 
115. Prencipe, A. (2004). Proprietary costs and 
determinants of voluntary segment disclosure: 
evidence from Italian listed companies. European 
Accounting Review, 13(2), 319-340. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0963818042000204742 
116. Qu, W., & Leung, P. (2006). Cultural impact on 
Chinese corporate disclosure – a corporate 
governance perspective. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 21(3), 241-264. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
02686900610652991 
117. Quagli, A. (2004). Comunicare il futuro: 
L’informativa economico-finanziaria di tipo 
previsionale delle società quotate italiane. Milano: 
FrancoAngeli.  
118. Raithatha, M., & Bapat, V. (2014). Impact of 
corporate governance on financial disclosures: 
Evidence from India. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 12(1), 874-889. https://doi.org/10.22495/ 
cocv12i1c9p10 
119. Reed, R., & DeFillippi, R. J. (1990). Causal 
ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable 
competitive advantage. Academy of management 
review, 15(1), 88-102. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
258107 
120. Rensburg, R., & Botha, E. (2014). Is integrated 
reporting the silver bullet of financial 
communication? A stakeholder perspective from 
South Africa. Public Relations Review, 40(2), 144-
152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2013. 11.016 
121. Ricart, J. E., Rodríguez, M.A., & Sánchez, P. (2005). 
Sustainability in the boardroom: An empirical 
examination of Dow Jones Sustainability World 
Index leaders. Corporate Governance: the 
international journal of business in society, 5(3), 
24-41. https://doi.org/10.1108/1472070051060 4670 
122. Richardson, A. J., & Welker, M. (2001). Social 
disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. Accounting, organizations and 
society, 26(7), 597-616. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
S0361-3682(01)00025-3 
123. Robinson, G., & Dechant, K. (1997). Building a 
business case for diversity. The Academy of 
Management Executive, 11(3), 21-31. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AME.1997.9709231661 
124. Rose, C. (2005). The composition of semi‐two‐tier 
corporate boards and firm performance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
13(5), 691-701. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2005.00460.x 
125. Samaha, J., Bauer, P., Cimaroli, S., & Postle, B. R. 
(2015). Top-down control of the phase of alpha-
band oscillations as a mechanism for temporal 
prediction. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 112(27), 8439-8444. https://doi.org/ 
10.1073/pnas.1503686112 
126. Schweiger, D. M., Sandberg, W. R., & Ragan, J. W. 
(1986). Group approaches for improving strategic 
decision making: A comparative analysis of 
dialectical inquiry, devil's advocacy, and 
consensus. Academy of management Journal, 
29(1), 51-71. https://doi.org/10.2307/255859 
127. Sierra‐Garcia, L., Zorio‐Grima, A., & Garcia‐Benau, 
M. A. (2015). Stakeholder engagement, corporate 
social responsibility and integrated reporting: An 
exploratory study. Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, 22(5), 286-304. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1345 
128. Singh, V., Vinnicombe, S., & Johnson, P. (2001). 
Women directors on top UK boards. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 9(3), 206-
216. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00248 
129. Singhvi, S. S., & Desai, H. B. (1971). An empirical 
analysis of the quality of corporate financial 
disclosure. The Accounting Review, 46(1), 129-138. 
130. Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment 
opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, 
and compensation policies. Journal of financial 
Economics, 32(3), 263-292. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W 
131. Soliman, M. M., Ragab, A. A., & Eldin, M. B. (2014). 
Board composition, ownership structure and 
voluntary disclosure: an empirical study of the 
listed companies in Egypt. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 11(2), 415-426. https://doi.org/ 
10.22495/cocv11i2c4p6 
132. Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002). What makes great boards 
great. Harvard business review, 80(9), 106-113. 
133. Sotorrío, L. L., & Sánchez, J. L. F. (2010). Corporate 
social reporting for different audiences: the case 
of multinational corporations in Spain. Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management, 17(5), 272-283. https://doi.org/ 
10.1002/csr.215 
134. Spero, L. L. (1979). The extent and causes of 
voluntary disclosure of financial information in 
three European capital markets: An exploratory 
study. University Microfilms. 
135. Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. (2011). Female 
directors and earnings quality. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(5), 1610-1644. https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01071.x 
136. Stubbs, W. & Higgins, C. (2012). Sustainability and 
Integrated Reporting: A Study of the Inhibitors and 
Enablers of Integrated Reporting. Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia. 
137. Suttipun, M. (2017). The effect of integrated 
reporting on corporate financial performance: 
Evidence from Thailand. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 15(1), 133-142. https://doi.org/ 
10.22495/cocv15i1art13 
138. Torchia, M., Calabrò, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women 
directors on corporate boards: From tokenism to 
critical mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2), 
299-317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-
0815-z 
139. Ullmann, A. A. (1985). Data in search of a theory: 
A critical examination of the relationships among 
social performance, social disclosure, and 
economic performance of US firms. Academy of 
management review, 10(3), 540-557.  
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1985.4278989 
140. Useem, M. (1993). Executive defense: Shareholder 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 1, Fall 2017 Continued - 2 
 
458 
power and corporate reorganization. Harvard 
University Press. 
141. Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and 
firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 
53(1), 113-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(99)00018-5 
142. Van Bommel, K. (2014). Towards a legitimate 
compromise? An exploration of integrated 
reporting in the Netherlands. Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, 27(7), 1157-1189. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-04-2013-1309 
143. Van der Walt, N., Ingley, C., Shergill, G. S., & 
Townsend, A. (2006). Board configuration: Are 
diverse boards better boards? Corporate 
Governance: The international journal of business 
in society, 6(2), 129-147. https://doi.org 
/10.1108/14720700610655141 
144. Vani Kant, B. (2001). Logit and probit. USA: Sage 
Publishing. 
145. Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. 
Journal of accounting and economics, 5, 179-194. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3 
146. Watson, W. E., Kumar, K., & Michaelsen, L. K. 
(1993). Cultural diversity’s impact on interaction 
process and performance: Comparing 
homogeneous and diverse task groups. Academy 
of management journal, 36(3), 590-602. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256593 
147. Westphal, J. D., & Milton, L. P. (2000). How 
experience and network ties affect the influence of 
demographic minorities on corporate boards. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2), 366-398. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2667075 
148. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of 
companies with a small board of directors. Journal 
of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5 
149. Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996). Director 
reputation, CEO/board power, and the dynamics 
of board interlocks. Academy of Management 
Proceedings, 1, 254-258. https://doi.org/ 
10.5465/AMBPP.1996.4980568 
 
 
 
